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VI 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
ABRAHAM MARIO SHAFFER, : Case No. 20090274-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Appellant is incarcerated. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(j) (2008), where the Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court for 
disposition. In trial court proceedings, the court entered judgment and conviction against 
Appellant Abraham Mario Shaffer for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony offense 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2008). The judgment is attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Whether the defendant is entitled to a remedy for the prosecutor's breach of the 
plea agreement during sentencing proceedings. 
Standard of Review. Since defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's 
remarks at sentencing or move to have them stricken, the issue is raised under the plain-
error and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel doctrines. Under the plain-error doctrine, this 
Court will assess whether the error was plain, obvious, and prejudicial. See State v. Hale, 
No. 20040363-CA, 2005 UT App 305, *l-2 (applying the plain-error standard to 
1 
defendant's claim that the State breached its agreement with respect to recommendations 
at sentencing; and remanding for specific performance). Under the ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel doctrine, this Court will assess whether defense counsel's failure to 
object constituted deficient performance, and whether it prejudiced the defendant. See 
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). 
Preservation: The issue was not preserved. Consequently, Shaffer has raised it 
under the plain-error doctrine and the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel doctrine. See 
Hale, 2005 UT App 305, *l-2; Templin 805 P.2d at 186. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions are relevant to the issue on appeal and set forth at 
Addendum B: U.S. Const, amend. VI (ensuring the right to counsel); U.S. Const, amend. 
XIV, § 1 (ensuring due process). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below 
On February 4, 2008, the State filed an Information against Shaffer for aggravated 
robbery. (R. 1-4). The State gave notice that it intended to seek gun and gang 
enhancements. (R. 1-4). On April 17, 2008, the trial court conducted a preliminary 
hearing. (R. 41-42). At the conclusion, the court bound Shaffer over for trial on the 
charge. (R. 42). On December 15, 2008, the State and Shaffer entered into an 
agreement. Shaffer agreed to plead guilty to aggravated robbery, a first degree felony 
(see R. 95-96), and the State agreed to dismiss the enhancements and to recommend two 
years in jail "with credit for time served and a suspended prison sentence," among other 
things. (R. 99). On March 9, 2009, the trial court sentenced Shaffer to an indeterminate 
term of five years to life at the Utah State Prison. (R. 113). On April 3, 2009, Shaffer 
filed a notice of appeal. (R. 116-117). The appeal is timely. Utah R. Crim. P. 3 and 4 
(2008). Shaffer is incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 30, 2008, three men entered a Spring Communications store. (See R. 
94:5-6, 8, 13). According to employee Cassidy Mills, Shaffer was among the three. (R. 
94:8-9). Mills testified that Shaffer pointed a gun at him (R. 94:18-20, 34), and the men 
took seven phones and $35 from the till. (R. 94:17-23). After the men left the store, 
Mills called the police and a customer assisted him in identifying the car. (R. 94:22-23). 
The police arrested the men later that evening. (See R. 94:46-51 (stating an officer 
located the suspect vehicle and set up surveillance at their home); 94:65-73 (stating 
officers had the suspects in custody and located cellular phones and a weapon)). 
On February 4, 2008, the State charged Shaffer with aggravated robbery, a first 
degree felony offense. (R. 1-4). The State also charged the two codefendants. (R. 5 
(referencing codefendants)). The State notified Shaffer that it would seek both gun and 
gang enhancements, which would add several years to a prison term. (See R. 1-4); Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-3-203.l(3)(e); 76-3-203.8(2)(a) (2008). In separate proceedings the 
codefendants were convicted of second-degree-felony robbery and placed on probation. 
(R. 134: AP&P Presentence Report, page 4). 
On December 15, 2008, Shaffer entered a guilty plea to the first degree felony 
offense. (See R. 95-102; 131:7-8). In exchange and as an "inducement[]" (R. 131:3), the 
prosecutor promised, first, that she would not "pursue the gun and gang enhancements" 
against Shaffer (R. 99; 131:3-4); second, that she would recommend "both to the - pre-
sentence investigator and at the time of sentencing" (R. 131:4) that Shaffer serve two 
years in jail with credit for time served (R. 99; 131:4); and third, that she would join in a 
motion to reduce the conviction from a first-degree-felony offense to a second-degree-
felony offense upon Shaffer's successful completion of probation. (R. 99:131:4); Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (2008) (allowing for a reduction in the conviction). A copy of the 
plea agreement (R. 95-102) is attached as Addendum C; and a copy of the change-of-plea 
transcript (R. 131) is attached as Addendum D. 
The trial court advised Shaffer that it was not bound by the prosecutor's promises, 
and that it may sentence Shaffer to a prison term of five years to life. (R. 131:5-6). 
Shaffer said he understood (R. 131:6), and he entered the guilty plea. (R. 131:7-10). 
On March 9, 2009, the trial court conducted sentencing proceedings. (R. 132). As 
of that date, Shaffer had served more than 13 months in jail. (See R. 134: AP&P 
Presentence Report, page 4 (stating Shaffer "was booked into jail" on January 30, 2008)). 
During sentencing, the prosecutor did not make the specific recommendations as she had 
promised. (See R. 132:13-14). Rather, the prosecutor requested "gang conditions" at 
sentencing. She stated, "I am asking for gang conditions, while the defendant may claim 
he's not a member of a gang, given that the co-defendants he was with were members of 
gangs, they're documented members of gangs and the defense has verified that he needs 
to have gang conditions." (R. 132:13). Notably, the defense did not verify a need for 
gang conditions. (See R. 131:8-9; 134: AP&P Presentence Report, pages 2, 3-4, and 6). 
Rather, both defense counsel and Shaffer specified that Shaffer was not involved in a 
gang. (R. 132:7-8; 134: AP&P Presentence Report, pages 2 and 6). 
In addition, the prosecutor recommended "at [a] minimum, another year in jail 
followed by 36-months probation." (R. 132:14). She did not recommend credit for time 
served and she specified that the victim, Cassidy Mills, "felt that the defendant should be 
incarcerated for as long as possible." (R. 132:14). Thereafter, the trial court ordered 
Shaffer to serve a prison term of five years to life. (R. 131:15; 113). A copy of the 
sentencing transcript (R. 132) is attached as Addendum E. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The prosecutor made promises to Shaffer to induce him to enter into a plea agree-
ment for a first degree felony offense. She promised to make a recommendation to the 
agent preparing the presentence report and to the court that Shaffer serve a two-year jail 
term with credit for time served followed by probation, and she promised to abandon gun 
and gang enhancements. As a result of the promises, Shaffer entered a guilty plea on a 
first degree felony offense. Thereafter, the prosecutor breached the plea agreement. 
Specifically, she failed to make any recommendations to the agent preparing the 
presentence report. Consequently, the agent recommended that Shaffer be sentenced to 
prison for an indeterminate term, which may be for life. In addition, while Shaffer had 
already served a year and 39 days in jail, the prosecutor recommended an additional year 
in jail with "no credit" for time served, she made disparaging remarks about Shaffer's 
family to send the message that he would not "behave" in the community if given a 
reduced incarceration term, she continued to brand him as affiliated with gangs, and she 
specified that the victim was requesting the longest possible sentence for the offense: life 
in prison. Given the prosecutor's breach, Shaffer is entitled to a remedy. Since trial 
counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's conduct, Shaffer has raised the issue here 
under the plain-error doctrine and the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel doctrine. 
ARGUMENT 
THE PROSECUTOR'S BREACH OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT 
WARRANTS REMAND FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. 
A. PLEA AGREEMENTS AND THE LAW. 
(1) Contract Principles Apply to Plea Agreements. 
"
c[P]lea bargaining' is an essential component of the administration of justice," 
and when "[p]roperly administered," it is encouraged. Santobello v. New York* 404 U.S. 
257, 260 (1971). Plea agreements can result in the prompt disposition of criminal cases 
without trial, thus saving the State time, money, and other resources. See_ id^ 
"Many courts, including the Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme 
Court, have referred to plea agreements as contracts and have applied principles derived 
from contract law to plea agreements." State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 386 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997) (citing, Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262; State v. West 765 P.2d 891, 896 (Utah 
1988)). For example, plea agreements - like contracts - recognize the principle of 
consideration. In State v. West, the Utah Supreme Court stated, "The nature of plea 
bargains requires the exchange of consideration, allowing the parties involved to reach a 
mutually desirable agreement. A plea bargain is a contractual relationship in which 
consideration is passed." 765 P.2d at 896. 
Moreover, "[w]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agree-
ment of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be the inducement or consideration, such 
promise must be fulfilled." State v. Smith, No. 20060473-CA, No. 20060474-CA, 2006 
UT App 510, *1 (citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262); Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261 
(requiring "fairness in securing [an] agreement between an accused and a prosecutor"). 
(2) The Government Is Held to a Higher Standard in Plea Agreements. 
Plea agreements also differ from contracts in relevant respects. Specifically, "in 
interpreting plea agreements or determining their validity, courts may in certain 
circumstances hold the government to a higher standard than the defendant." Patience, 
944 P.2d at 387 (citing, ^ , United States v. Rinzlinz, 988 F.2d 504, 506 (4th Cir. 1993) 
("c[B]oth constitutional and supervisory concerns require holding the government to a 
greater degree of responsibility than the defendant... for imprecisions or ambiguities in 
plea agreements.'") (citation omitted)). In addition, courts construe ambiguities in the 
plea agreement against the government and in favor of the defendant. See, e.g.. United 
States v. Jeffries, 908 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Franco-
Lopez, 312 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir. 2002); InreAltro, 180 F.3d 372, 375 (2d Cir. 1999). 
That is because, unlike ordinary contracts, the government enjoys significant bargaining 
power and the plea agreement calls for a defendant to waive fundamental constitutional 
rights. See, e.g. Altro, 180 F.3d at 375; Jeffries, 908 F.2d at 1523. 
(3) A Prosecutor Must Abide by the Terms of an Agreement in Letter and Spirit. 
In Santobello, the prosecutor and the defendant entered into negotiations: the 
defendant agreed to plead guilty to a lesser offense, which carried a prison sentence of 
one year, and the prosecutor "agreed to make no recommendation as to the sentence." 
404 U.S. at 258. After a series of delays, and after the judge, the prosecutor, and defense 
counsel were replaced by other individuals, the new prosecutor requested "the maximum 
one-year sentence," uL at 258-59, the defendant objected, UL at 259, and the judge 
entered sentencing. The judge relied on the presentence report and ordered the maximum 
sentence; he did not rely "at all" on what the prosecutor said. IcL at 259. The defendant 
appealed and claimed the prosecutor breached the terms of the agreement. On certiorari 
review, the United States Supreme Court agreed. It referred to the prosecutor's actions as 
"another example of an unfortunate lapse in orderly prosecutorial procedure." IdL at 260. 
Also, it stated "the prosecution is not in a good position to argue that its inadvertent 
breach of agreement is immaterial." Id. at 262. It faulted the prosecution for failing to 
ensure fairness at sentencing, it vacated the judgment, and it remanded the case for 
specific performance of the agreement at sentencing before a different judge, or an 
opportunity for the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. IdL at 263. 
Under Santobello and its progeny, due process "requires that the bargain be kept 
when the plea of guilty is entered." Van Buskirk v. State, 720 P.2d 1215, 1216 (Nev. 
1986); see also U.S. Const, amend. XIV (ensuring due process). Indeed, the government 
"must adhere strictly to the terms of the bargain it strikes with defendants." United States 
v. Miller, 565 F.2d 1273, 1274 (3d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 436 U.S. 959 (1978). A 
prosecutor is held to a meticulous standard of promise and performance in both letter and 
spirit. Citti v. State, 807 P.2d 724, 726 (Nev. 1991) (stating when the State enters a plea 
agreement, "it 'is held to "the most meticulous standards of both promise and 
performance"'") (citation omitted); United States v. Jimenez, 928 F.2d 356, 363 (10th 
Cir. 1991) (construing the plea agreement according to what the defendant reasonably 
understood when he entered the plea), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 854 (1991). 
In United States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1992), the defendant entered 
an agreement to plead guilty to four counts of defrauding a bank. During the plea 
proceedings, the prosecutor stipulated that for sentencing purposes, the defendant's 
"conduct did not involve more than minimal planning." IcL at 933, 940. Thereafter, the 
United States Probation Office prepared the presentence report and increased the offense 
level, stating that defendant's conduct "involved more than minimal planning," he "was 
an organizer or leader of the crime charged," and he "abuse[d] a position of trust." IcL at 
933. At sentencing, the prosecutor referenced the earlier stipulated agreement, but then 
took "exception" and stated the defendant's conduct reflected "an affirmative step" in the 
offense, where he was "concealing something." IcL at 939. At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the district court sentenced the defendant based on the increased levels set forth 
in the presentence report. Id. at 933. 
On appeal, the court ruled that the prosecutor's statements at sentencing "violated 
the spirit, if not the letter, of the plea agreement," and provided the trial court with a basis 
for rejecting the sentence that defendant anticipated at the time of the plea. IcL at 940, 
941. According to the court, "if the stipulation bargained for" by the defendant "is to 
mean anything, it must preclude remarks like the government made here. We cannot 
countenance such a blithe repudiation of the terms of a negotiated plea. "Santobello and 
its progeny proscribe not only explicit repudiation of the government's assurances, but 
must in the interests of fairness be read to forbid end-runs around them."5 Id. at 941 
(internal citations omitted). The court remanded the case to the trial court for further 
proceedings. IcL; see also United States v. Rivera, 357 F.3d 290, 295-97 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(remanding for breach of the plea agreement); State v. Sodders, 633 P.2d 432, 438 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1981) (stating "[a] breach of a plea agreement occurs not only when the 
prosecution breaks its promise, but also when the spirit of the inducement is breached") 
(citation omitted); Van Buskirk, 720 P.2d at 1216 (stating "[t]he violation of the terms or 
'the spirit' of the plea bargain requires reversal"); State v. BlackwelU 522 S.E.2d 313, 315 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (ruling the "defendant should not be forced to anticipate loopholes 
that the State might create in its own promises"; and stating, "even if the State did not 
violate the express terms of the plea agreement, it did violate the spirit of that 
agreement") (emphasis in original); State v. Xaviar, 69 P.3d 901, 903-04 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2003) (ruling the prosecutor's comments at sentencing constituted a breach of the 
agreement, where the prosecutor recommended the sentence as promised, but then 
"proceeded to (1) emphasize the graveness of the situation; (2) reiterate the charges that 
the State did not bring; (3) note that the State had forgone the opportunity to ask for a 60-
year exceptional sentence; and (4) highlight aggravating circumstances that would 
support an exceptional sentence," thereby effectively undercutting the plea agreement); 
State v. Ferguson, 479 N.W.2d 241, 243 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (stating "Santobello 
proscribes not only explicit repudiations of plea agreements, but also c end-runs around 
them'"; and "[t]he state may not accomplish 'through indirect means what it promised 
not to do directly,' i.e., convey a message to the trial court that a defendant's actions 
warrant a more severe sentence than that recommended"). 
(4) If a Prosecutor Breaches an Agreement, Defendant Is Entitled to a Remedy. 
"[W]hen a prosecutor fails to fulfill promises made to the defendant in negotiating 
a plea bargain, the defendant's constitutional rights have been violated and he is entitled 
to relief." Northeast Motor Co. v. N.C. State Board of Alcoholic Control 241 S.E.2d 727, 
729 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978) (citing Santobello, 404 U.S. 257); see also Cittu 807 P.2d at 
726 (stating a violation of the terms or the spirit of the agreement requires reversal) 
(citation omitted). Relief should be determined by the trial court, and is either specific 
performance or withdrawal of the plea (i.e., rescission). See, e.g., Santobello, 404 U.S. at 
263 (stating the trial court is in a better position to decide the circumstances for relief); 
West, 765 P.2d at 896 (stating when the State fails to fulfill its side of the bargain, the 
remedy is frequently specific performance); State v. Felder, No. 20060837-CA, 2007 UT 
App 172, *1 (unpublished) (remanding for specific performance); State v. Smith, No. 
20060473-CA, No. 20060474-CA, 2006 UT App 510, *1 (unpublished) (same); State v. 
Hawkins, No. 20050947-CA, 2006 UT App 410, *1 (unpublished) (remanding for 
resentencing by a different judge); Hale, 2005 UT App 305, *1, 3 (unpublished) 
(remanding for plain error and a remedy where the State breached the plea agreement); 
State v. Smit, 2004 UT App 222, f 17, 95 P.3d 1203 (stating the proper remedy for breach 
of a plea agreement is specific performance or withdrawal of the plea); State v. Moss, 921 
P.2d 1021, 1026 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing that a "remedy is constitutionally 
required when the State reneges on a promise that formed the basis for a plea 
agreement"). 
Even if there is reason to believe the judge was not influenced by the prosecutor's 
breach of the agreement at sentencing, the United States Supreme Court has stated, "the 
interests of justice and appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation 
to promises made in the negotiation of pleas of guilty will be best served by remanding 
the case to the state courts for further consideration." Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262-63. 
B. THE PROSECUTOR PROMISED THAT IN EXCHANGE FOR SHAFFER'S 
PLEA ON A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, SHE WOULD MAKE SENTENCING 
RECOMMENDATIONS. THE PROSECUTOR BREACHED THE 
AGREEMENT. SHAFFER IS ENTITLED TO A REMEDY. 
The record supports that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement in letter and 
spirit. In exchange for Shaffer's guilty plea for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, 
the prosecutor agreed to abandon gun and gang enhancements against Shaffer, and she 
agreed to recommend both in the presentence report and at sentencing that the judge 
suspend the prison term and impose a two-year jail term with credit for time served, 
followed by probation. (SeeR. 99; 131:3-5). 
Thereafter, the prosecutor breached the terms of the agreement. Specifically, she 
did not make any recommendation for the presentence report as promised. (Compare R. 
131:3-5 (reflecting promises); and R. 134: AP&P Presentence Report). She failed to 
"adhere strictly to the terms of the bargains [she struck] with [the] defendant[]." U.S. v. 
Miller, 565 F.2d 1273, 1274 (3d Cir. 1977); Smith, 2006 UT App 510, *1 (recognizing 
the prosecution must fulfill promise); CittU 807 P.2d at 726 (recognizing the government 
is held to "cthe most meticulous standards of both promise and performance'") (citation 
omitted). As a result, the agent preparing the report made minimal reference to the plea 
agreement (R. 134: AP&P Presentence Report, page 3 (stating only that "defendant pled 
guilty as charged to Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony")), and he recommended 
the maximum sentence: a prison term of five years to life. (Id., page 1). 
Next, at sentencing, the prosecutor stated she would "stick with" the recommenda-
tions as agreed. (R. 132:13). However, she did not request two years in jail with credit 
for time served, or expressly abandon sentencing for gang conditions. Rather, the prose-
cutor sent the message that two years in jail was insufficient. Indeed, she recommended 
that Shaffer be sentenced "at [a] minimum''' to another year in jail (R. 132:14 (emphasis 
added)) "with no credit for the time he's already served." (R. 132:13 (emphasis added)). 
That statement violated the agreement. (See R. 99; 131:3-5 (reflecting the agreement 
where the prosecutor would recommend two years in jail with credit for time served)); 
Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 941 (stating Santobello proscribes explicit repudiation of the 
government's promises and it forbids "'end-runs around them'") (citations omitted); 
Miller, 565 F.2d at 1274 (stating the prosecution "must adhere strictly to the terms of the 
bargains it strikes with defendants"); Van Buskirk, 720 P.2d at 1216 (stating "[t]he 
violation of the terms or 'the spirit' of the plea bargain requires reversal"); BlackwelL 522 
S.E.2d at 315 (ruling the "defendant should not be forced to anticipate loopholes that the 
State might create in its own promises"). 
Moreover, the prosecutor expressed "concerns with the defendant's family" and 
stated to the court that Shaffer's father was deceptive and manipulative (R. 132:13-14) 
and his sister was a liar, "so frankly, anything from his family, I don't take to be true." 
(R. 132:14). Those statements undermined the support for Shaffer in the community and 
left the impression that the court should not have "any reassurance[]" that Shaffer would 
"behave" if given a reduced incarceration term. (R. 132:13-14). The statements 
constituted a violation of the agreement. See Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 941 (stating the 
prosecutor's remarks "were meant to serve as a possible basis for the district court to 
ignore the stipulation in the plea agreement"); see also Xaviar, 69 P.3d at 903-04 
(recognizing that the prosecutor made the promised recommendations and also made 
statements to undercut the plea agreement in violation of the promise). 
In addition, the prosecutor advised the court that the victim, Cassidy Mills, "felt 
that the defendant should be incarcerated for as long as possible" on the first degree 
felony. (R. 132:14). Since the longest possible incarceration would be prison for life, the 
prosecutor's statements were an end-run around the promise to recommend a limited jail 
term with credit for time served. (See R. 99; 131:3-5 (prosecutor's promises)); Rivera, 
357 F.3d at 295-97 (remanding for breach of the agreement); Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 941 
(stating if the agreement "is to mean anything," it must preclude blithe repudiation of the 
terms of the agreement and forbid "'end-runs around them'") (citation omitted); Xayiqr, 
69 P.3d at 903-04 (stating the prosecutor recommended the sentence as agreed but also 
emphasized the graveness of the situation, the charges the state did not bring, and other 
circumstances to undercut the agreement); BlackwelL 522 S.E.2d at 315 (stating the 
defendant should not be forced to anticipate loopholes in the State's promises). 
Finally, the prosecutor requested "gang conditions" in sentencing, and claimed the 
defense "has verified that he needs to have gang conditions." (R. 132:13). Yet the 
defense verified no such thing. (See R. 134: AP&P Presentence Report, pages 2 and 6 
(denying affiliation with gangs)). The request for gang conditions was intended to send 
the message that even though the prosecutor had agreed to abandon gang enhancements 
(see R. 99; 131:3-5), she considered it necessary to brand Shaffer as affiliated with gangs. 
That was improper. See Rivera, 357 F.3d at 295-97 (remanding for breach of the plea 
agreement); Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 941 (stating Santobello forbids "end-runs around" 
the agreed upon promise); Xgviar, 69 P.3d at 903-04 (stating the prosecutor 
recommended the sentence as agreed but also emphasized the graveness of the situation, 
reiterated charges the state did not bring, and highlighted other circumstances to undercut 
the plea agreement); Blackwell, 522 S.E.2d at 315 (stating the defendant should not be 
forced to anticipate loopholes in the State's promises). 
Shaffer did not receive the benefit of his bargain in the plea agreement. He is 
entitled to a remedy: "[Wjhen a plea agreement is breached by the prosecutor, the proper 
remedy is either specific performance of the plea agreement or withdrawal of the guilty 
plea both at the discretion of the trial judge." Srnit, 2004 UT App 222, f 17; see also 
Citti, 807 P.2d at 726 (stating that a violation of either "'the terms or "the spirit" of the 
plea bargain requires reversal'") (citation omitted). The remedy should be determined by 
the trial court under the circumstances and in further proceedings. See Santobello, 404 
U.S. at 263 (stating the trial court is in a better position to decide the circumstances for 
relief); see also Hale, 2005 UT App 305, *1, 3 (unpublished) (remanding to the trial court 
for the proper remedy, either specific performance or withdrawal of the agreement). 
Shaffer respectfully requests that this Court remand the case for further proceedings and 
relief. 
C. THE COURT MAY ASSESS THE ISSUE UNDER THE PLAIN-ERROR OR 
INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE-OF-COUNSEL DOCTRINE. 
Shaffer raises this sentencing issue for the first time on appeal. Thus, this Court 
may review it under the plain-error doctrine or the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
doctrine. See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, Tf 13, 95 P.3d 276 (stating "appellate courts will 
not consider an issue, including constitutional arguments, raised for the first time on 
appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or the case involves exceptional 
circumstances"); Hale, 2005 UT App 305, *1 (unpublished) (considering plain error); see 
also Xaviar, 69 P.3d at 903 (stating "the defendant can raise the issue of the prosecutor's 
breach for the first time on appeal"). 
(1) The Record Supports Plain Error. 
"To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that c(i) an error exists; (ii) 
the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., 
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
appellant.'" Hale, 2005 UT App 305, *1 (unpublished) (citing Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 15). 
In this case, error exists where the prosecutor breached the plea agreement at sen-
tencing. (See supra, Argument B., herein). At the time of the agreement, the prosecutor 
promised to recommend a suspended prison term and two years in jail with credit for 
time served, and she promised to abandon both gun and gang enhancements in exchange 
for Shaffer's plea. (R. 99; 131:3-5). Thereafter in connection with sentencing, the 
prosecutor failed to make recommendations for the presentence report as promised; she 
requested "at [a] minimum" an additional year in jail with "no credit" for time served; 
she made statements to undercut Shaffer's community and family support; she reminded 
the court of the abandoned enhancements by requesting "gang conditions;'9 and she 
advised the court that the victim requested that Shaffer be incarcerated for "as long as 
possible." (See R. 132:13-14). The prosecutor's breach of the agreement constituted 
error. (See supra, Arguments A. and B., herein); Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260 (referring to 
the prosecutor's breach as "another example of an unfortunate lapse in orderly 
prosecutorial procedures"). 
The trial judge would have been aware of the breach since the judge presided over 
both the plea proceedings and the sentencing proceedings. (See R. 131; 132). In that 
regard the breach was obvious. See_ Hale, 2005 UT App 305, *1 (unpublished) (stating, 
"The trial court committed plain error by not recognizing the breach and providing the 
appropriate relief- 'specific performance of the plea agreement or withdrawal of the 
guilty plea'") (citing SmiU 2004 UT App 222, \ 17). 
Moreover, the error was harmful. An error is harmful if the State induced the 
defendant to enter into the agreement with a promise. See_ Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262 
(stating when a plea rests on a promise and the promise is the inducement or considera-
tion, the prosecutor must fulfill the promise). In this case, the prosecutor induced Shaffer 
to enter into a plea for a first degree felony offense by making promises. (R. 99; 131:3-
5). Shaffer would not have entered the plea but for the promises. (See R. 131:3 (stating 
the promises were "inducements" for the plea)). That is sufficient for the prejudice analy-
sis. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262 (stating that even if the breach did not influence the 
judge in sentencing, it warranted a remedy in the "interests of justice and [the] appro-
priate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation to the promises made in the 
negotiation of pleas"); see also Hale, 2005 UT App 305, *1 (unpublished) (acknow-
ledging that the prosecutor's promise was rendered meaningless, resulting in prejudice to 
the defendant since he would not have entered the agreement but for the promise). 
In addition, the error was harmful where the prosecutor's conduct in connection 
with sentencing proceedings contributed to the trial court's decision to sentence Shaffer 
to prison for life. (See R. 132:15-16 (reflecting trial court's sentencing)). Specifically, 
the prosecutor did not honor her part of the agreement to make recommendations to the 
agent preparing the presentence report. (Compare R. 131:3-5 (the prosecutor's promise); 
and R. 134: AP&P Presentence Report). Consequently, the presentence report 
unequivocally recommended a prison term (R. 134: AP&P Presentence Report), and the 
trial court relied on the report to sentence Shaffer to prison. (R. 132:15). Also, the 
prosecutor sent a decisively negative message to the trial court at sentencing where she 
refused to recommend credit for time served, she requested another year in jail "at [a] 
minimum," she claimed Shaffer's community support could not be trusted, she continued 
to brand him as affiliated with gangs, and she specified that the victim was requesting the 
longest possible sentence for the offense: life in prison. (R. 132:13-14). Those remarks 
"were meant to serve as a possible basis for the district court to ignore the stipulation in 
the plea agreement." Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 941; see also id,, at 940 (recognizing that 
the prosecutor's statements at sentencing provided the trial court with a basis for rejecting 
the earlier recommendations); Xaviar, 69 P.3d at 904 (stating "the prosecutor clearly 
signaled to the court" her lack of support for the stipulation and "'effectively undercut the 
plea agreement'") (citation omitted). Under the circumstances, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the trial court would not have ordered the maximum prison sentence if the 
prosecutor had adhered to the terms of the bargain in letter and spirit. Indeed, if the 
prosecutor had been held to the most meticulous standard in making sentencing 
recommendations, the court likely would have entered a sentence more favorable to 
Shaffer. That supports prejudice; Shaffer is entitled to a remedy. See_ Hale, 2005 UT 
App 305, *2 (unpublished) (remanding for remedy under the plain-error analysis). 
(2) The Record Supports Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 
The Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution provides a criminal defendant 
with the right to the effective assistance of counsel at all stages of the criminal 
prosecution in state court. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-88 
(1984); see also State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1994) (stating defendants are 
"wholly dependent on the dedication of their attorneys to protect their interests and to 
ensure their fair treatment under the law"); U.S. Const, amend. VI. To establish a claim 
of ineffective assistance, a defendant must show, first, that his attorney's performance 
was deficient in that it "'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,'" and 
second, "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Templin, 805 P.2d at 
186-87 (footnotes and citations omitted); see also State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, ^ | 
7 & 10, 132 P.3d 703 (stating this Court will consider ineffective assistance of counsel 
even where trial counsel "affirmatively approved" of erroneous matters at trial). 
For the first step, the United States Supreme Court has stated the following: 
A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the 
acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reason-
able professional judgment. The court must then determine whether, in light of all 
the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance. In making that determination, the court 
should keep in mind that counsel's function, as elaborated in prevailing 
professional norms, is to make the adversarial testing process work in the 
particular case. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (emphasis added); Templin, 805 P.2d at 186. 
The first prong of the analysis is obvious in the law and on the face of the record 
here. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (stating an ineffectiveness claim must be judged on 
the facts of the case at the time of the conduct). The prosecutor breached the letter and 
the spirit of the plea agreement. (See, supra, Argument B., herein). In the face of that 
breach, defense counsel failed to object; she remained silent even though the prosecutor 
plainly failed to make recommendations in connection with the presentence report as 
promised (compare R. 131:3-5 (reflecting promises), and 134: AP&P Presentence 
Report; see also, supra, Argument C.(l), herein), and even though the prosecutor 
specifically requested "no credit" for time served and that Shaffer serve another year in 
jail "at [a] minimum"; claimed that Shaffer's community support could not be trusted; 
continued to brand Shaffer as affiliated with gangs; and represented that the victim 
requested incarceration for Shaffer "for as long as possible." (R. 132:13-14). 
Defense counsel's silence in the face of the prosecutor's breach of the agreement 
is not the result of reasonable professional judgment. See, e.g.. Hale, 2005 UT App 305, 
*1 n.3 (finding it interesting that defendant did not assert ineffective assistance of counsel 
"based on [defense] counsel's failure to mention or attempt to enforce the plea agreement 
at sentencing"; and ruling the prosecutor's breach was plain error). Effective counsel 
would have known the law and his or her duty to the client. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
688 (stating counsel "has a duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render 
the trial a reliable adversarial testing process"); see also ABA Stds for Crim. Justice, 
Prosecution Function and Defense Function (hereinafter "ABA Stds"), §§ 4-1.2(b), 4-3.6, 
4-7.9 (3d ed. 1993) (requiring defense counsel to make proper objections). 
Effective counsel would have made a professional and competent objection under 
the circumstances. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88 (setting forth defense counsel's 
duty to provide effective assistance and to "advocate the defendant's cause"); see also 
ABA Stds, §§ 4-3.6, 4-7.9; 1 Criminal Practice Manual, §6:14, page 6-9 (Thompson/ 
West 2005) (stating ineffective assistance is found in failure to object; stating a lawyer 
must focus on whether the process is fair). There is no conceivable reason to forego an 
objection when established law provides a remedy for a prosecutor's breach of the agree-
ment. See Santobello, 404 U.S. 257; Hale, 2005 UT App 305, *2 (unpublished) 
(recognizing that a defendant is entitled to a remedy for a prosecutor's breach); Moss, 
921 P.2d at 1026 (stating that "some remedy is constitutionally required when the State 
reneges on a promise that formed the basis for a plea agreement"). Under the 
circumstances, counsel's deficiencies fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
and were outside the range of professionally competent assistance. See. State v. Is on, 
2006 UT 26, ^ 32, 135 P.3d 864 (stating counsel cannot be excused for failing to recog-
nize potential issues at trial where no strategic reason exists for foregoing issue). 
In addition, Shaffer was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Under the law, 
prejudice exists if the State induced the defendant to enter into the agreement with a 
promise, and then breached the promise. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262 (stating when a 
plea rests on a promise and the promise is the inducement or consideration, the 
prosecutor must fulfill the promise). In this case, the State made promises for sentencing 
to induce Shaffer to plead guilty to a first degree felony offense. (R. 131:3-5). 
Thereafter, the prosecutor's statements constituted a breach of the agreement. (See, 
supra, Argument B., herein). That supports prejudice. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262 
(stating that even if the breach did not influence the judge in sentencing, it warranted a 
remedy in the "interests of justice and [the] appropriate recognition of the duties of the 
prosecution in relation to the promises made in the negotiation of pleas"); see also Hale, 
2005 UT App 305, *1 (unpublished) (acknowledging that the prosecutor's promise was 
rendered meaningless, and defendant would not have admitted the allegations but for the 
promise); Xaviar, 69 P.3d at 903 (stating the "constitutional dimensions of the plea 
agreement make it essential that the State fulfill its 'implied promise to act in good 
faith'"). As stated above, if defense counsel had promptly objected, Shaffer would have 
been entitled to a remedy. See, e.g., Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263; West, 765 P.2d at 896 
(stating when the State fails to fulfill its side of the bargain, the remedy is frequently 
specific performance); Felder, 2007 UT App 172, *1 (unpublished) (remanding for 
specific performance); Smith, 2006 UT App 510, *1 (unpublished) (same); Hawkins, 
2006 UT App 410, *1 (unpublished) (remanding for resentencing); Hale, 2005 UT App 
305, *2 (unpublished) (remanding for a remedy); Smit, 2004 UT App 222, |^ 17 (stating 
the proper remedy for breach of a plea agreement is specific performance or withdrawal 
of the plea); Moss, 921 P.2d at 1026 (recognizing that "some remedy is constitutionally 
required when the State reneges on a promise that formed the basis for a plea 
agreement"); (see also, supra, pages 11-12, 20-22, herein). 
In addition, if defense counsel had requested that the prosecutor be held to her 
promises, there is a reasonable likelihood that the agent preparing the presentence report 
would have taken the promised recommendations into consideration for the report. (See 
R. 131:3-5 (reflecting prosecutor's promise to make recommendations for the 
presentence report); see also, supra. Argument C.(l), herein). Likewise, if defense 
counsel had requested that the prosecutor be held to her promises, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the trial court would have taken the recommendations into consideration 
for a sentence more favorable to Shaffer. (See R. 131:3-5 (reflecting the prosecutor's 
promises)); see also Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 941 (stating the prosecutor's remarks pos-
sibly served as a basis for the court to ignore the agreed upon sentence). That supports 
prejudice. See, e.g.. State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989) (stating prejudice 
exists if there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant). 
Finally, if counsel had objected to the prosecutor's breach, Shaffer would have 
properly preserved the issue for appeal. Because trial counsel failed to object, Shaffer 
has been forced to argue plain error. (See supra, Argument C.(l), herein). His rights on 
appeal have been compromised by counsel's deficiencies. He should not be further 
punished for trial counsel's errors. This Court can and should address the issue on the 
merits to alleviate any additional prejudice against Shaffer in the matter. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Shaffer respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
the sentence, and remand the case for a proper remedy. 
SUBMITTED this 1 ( 7 ^ day of August, 2009. 
Linda M. Jones 
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All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state 
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of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
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IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
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Defendant. 
I, A hsc\U£*YY\ Q\/\o.+Jr r , hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been 
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading4uilty)(or no contest) to the following crimes: 
Crime & Statutory 
Provision 
A. 
B. 
C. 
^^^^
 VCK
^A fc^j(^»*'M 
Degree Punishment 
Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
A — $ l£>j aon 
D. 
1 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or 
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crhne(s) to which I am 
pleading guilty (or no contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty, (or no contest) are: 
/ » n&- I ~ &>l 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes 
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the 
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or 
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for 
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty 
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or 
no contest): 
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Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights 
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead 
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights: 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand 
that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed 
lawyer's service to me. 
I {have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel, 
I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that 
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty 
(or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the 
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is / n CCCUAJ& CU-r^\faj^^ 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and thexonsequences of 
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a 
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and 
b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to 
cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call witnesses 
if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony 
of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would 
pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to 
have a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose 
not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also 
know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal 
to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know-that if I do not plead guilty 
(or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged 
crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my 
case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each 
element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict 
must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of 
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or 
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the 
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up 
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). I understand that if I wish 
to appeal my sentence I must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after my sentence is 
entered. 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no 
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving 
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or 
both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of 
a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run 
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each 
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing 
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no 
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was 
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be 
inappropriate. 
1
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Plea agreement My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) ((jQare) (is/are not) the result of 
a plea agreement between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and 
provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those 
explained below: 
y\
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Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of title charges 
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they 
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to 
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes 
because all of the statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am 2I)years of age. I have attended school through the / '2- grade. I can read 
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been 
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drags, medication, or intoxicants which 
would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the 
influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing 
or from knowingly, intelligently, and volimtarily entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must 
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I understand 
that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be 
made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest I will only be allowed to withdraw 
my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any 
challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be pursued under the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Dated this 15 day of Vece^loe^ , 2 Qh?> 
t 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for Ah^L<x+* Mcxr/p %U&£f*<^ the defendant 
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have 
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of 
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are 
accurate and true. 
A T T O R N £ Y F O R D E F E N D A N T 
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Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
Akrw/ in*^ Sn-J'ttS^
 7 defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of 
Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which 
constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion 
to encourage a plea has been ofifered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained 
m the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before 
the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the 
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the 
acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest. ^ ^ 
PROSECUTE^ ATTORNEY 
BarNo._Z^V^ 
Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses 
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, 
knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that tihe defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the 
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this 1 fT day of D ^ c e m b ^ ^ " .2 Dbg. 
DISTRICT. COURT 
TabD 
^KIGINAL 
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MS. CHRISTIANSON: Your Honor, 
to call Abraham Mario Shaffer? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
would 
MS. CHRISTIANSON: He's in custody. 
MS. JOHNSON: Sandi Johnson for the 
fication 
rdings.) 
[ the Court 
State. 
be 
MS. CHRISTIANSEN: McCaye Christianson appearing 
. Shaffer. 
Judge, this matter, I believe, is set for 
disposition today and we do have a negotiated 
put on the record today. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MS. CHRISTIANSEN: Your Honor what 
resolution to 
is contemplated 
is that Mr. Shaffer will enter a guilty plea to aggravated 
robbery, a first-degree felony, as charged in the Information. 
In exchange for that, there are three things that 
have been offered, inducements that have been offered by the 
State. The first is that in connection with the--the charge 
in the Information, the State was pursuing both a gun 
enhancement and a gang enhancement, which would have added a 
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total of five years to the potential sentencing in this case, 
and those will be abandoned by the State in exchange for the 
plea. 
Additionally, your Honor, the State will be 
recommending at the--both to the--the pre-sentence 
investigator and at the time of sentencing to your Honor, that 
the prison sentence in this case be suspended and that the 
Court instead order Mr. Shaffer to serve two years in the 
County Jail, with credit for time served. 
Finally, in the event that Mr. Shaffer is successful 
in completing this five-year probationary period, upon being 
released from the County Jail, assuming that the Court does 
choose to approve that--that sentencing recommendation, at the 
conclusion of the five years, probation having been 
successfully completed, the State will be joining in my motion 
for the degree of the offense to be lowered by one level, from 
a first-degree felony to a second-degree felony. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. CHRISTIANSON: And your Honor, I have reviewed, 
I have filled out and reviewed a--a plea form with my client. 
I read the entire form out loud to him and he read (inaudible) 
along with me. 
THE COURT: I see. That's the State's offer in this 
case, Counsel? 
MS. JOHNSON: It is, your Honor, and we would move 
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1 to amend Count 1 by just striking the language, it's halfway 
2 down through the paragraph, the sentence ends: and/or caused 
3 serious bodily injury to Cassie Mills, period. Then it's the 
4 next sentence, begins, "Further." Starting with "further", 
5 the remaining of that paragraph, the State would strike that, 
6 with the understanding he's going to be pleading guilty to 
7 Count 1 then as charged. 
8 THE COURT: Now, is Mr. Shaffer the one who had the 
9 firearm in this robbery? 
10 MS. JOHNSON: Yes, your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: Mr. Shaffer, the State's made an offer 
12 of--to have you plead guilty to aggravated robbery, as 
13 charged, except the enhancement would be stricken, the 
14 enhancements. 
15 Is that what you understand? 
16 MR. SHAFFER: Yes, your Honor. 
17 (Inaudible discussion between Counsel and Mr. 
18 Shaffer) 
19 MR. SHAFFER: Yes, your Honor. 
2 0 THE COURT: Mr. Shaffer, let me just explain. The 
21 sentence that you face is--is a sentence of five years to life 
22 in prison. And there's no guarantee that I won't impose that, 
23 even though the State is not recommending that, in fact, is 
24 recommending a jail sentence instead. And if I chose to put 
25 you on probation, they'd recommend that you--that your--with 
1 guilty plea to the first-degree felony be withdrawn and you 
2 enter it, instead, to a second-degree felony. Those things 
3 are not binding on me. If they were and if it were proposed 
4 that way, I wouldn't accept it. So, I want to make it clear 
5 that I could give you the five-year-to-life sentence and 
6 there's no promise, no guarantee of any kind that you won't 
7 get that. Do you understand that? 
8 MR. SHAFFER: I understand. 
9 THE COURT: If you plead guilty, Mr. Shaffer, you're 
10 giving up the right that you have to a speedy trial before a 
11 public and impartial jury. You're presumed to be innocent of 
12 this charge and all of its elements and you have the right to 
13 a jury trial. The State would have to convince the jury 
14 beyond a reasonable doubt that you were guilty of all the 
15 elements of the offense and they'd have to convince the jury 
16 unanimously that you were guilty of all the elements of this 
17 offense or you would not be found guilty. 
18 At the trial, you have the right to remain silent, 
19 no one could force you to testify against yourself; in other 
20 words, you have the right to be free from compulsory self-
21 incrimination. But at the trial, if you wanted to, you could 
22 testify and let the jury hear your side of what happened. 
23 In fact, you'd have the right to have other 
24 witnesses testify for you and to have those witnesses 
25 subpoenaed and their attendance at trial compelled. You'd 
1 have the right to cross-examine or ask questions of the 
2 State's attorney (sic), you have the right to an appeal. 
3 If you plead guilty today, you're giving up all of 
4 those rights. Do you understand all of that? 
5 MR. SHAFFER: Yes, your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: The only right that you're not giving up 
7 of that group is the right to an appeal, but that right is 
8 certainly limited if you plead guilty. Do you understand 
9 that? 
10 MR. SHAFFER: Yes, your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: By pleading guilty, Mr. Shaffer, you're 
12 admitting that you committed the crime. Do you understand 
13 that? 
14 MR. SHAFFER: Yes, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Are you willing to admit that you 
16 committed this crime? 
17 Did you have a question, Mr. Shaffer? 
18 MR. SHAFFER: I just asked what the difference was 
19 between guilty and no contest plea. 
2 0 THE COURT: I don't think the State would accept a 
21 no contest plea and I don't believe that I would, either, in 
22 this case. So, if you don't want to plead guilty, of course, 
23 you don't have to and we could set this matter for trial. 
24 MR. SHAFFER: I plead guilty. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. If you plead guilty, you're 
1 admitting that you committed the crime and I'm going to define 
2 it for you. It alleges that you, as a party to the offense, 
3 unlawfully and intentionally took or attempted to take, 
4 personal property in the possession of someone else from that 
5 person or from their immediate presence and against their will 
6 and that you did so by means of force or fear and that you 
7 used or threatened the use of a dangerous weapon, those--or--
8 and/or you caused serious bodily injury, which I don't believe 
9 is alleged here. But those are the elements of the offense. 
10 Do you understand that, Mr. Shaffer? 
11 MR. SHAFFER: Yes, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Are you willing to admit that you 
13 committed that crime a I explained it to you? 
14 MR. SHAFFER: Yes, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: I'm going to ask the State, if you 
16 would, please, to explain the factual basis for this charge. 
17 MS. JOHNSON: Sorry, your Honor? 
18 THE COURT: Ms. Johnson, could I have you explain 
19 the factual basis for the charge? 
2 0 MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, on January 3 0th of 2 008, 
21 the defendant, along with two other individuals, entered a 
22 Sprint telephone store. They then took phones, the defendant 
23 specifically walked into a bathroom, pointed a gun at the cell 
24 phone's employer--or employee of the store and demanded some 
25 more phones. He then ran out of that store's closet with, I 
1 believe, it was eight cell phones. And then the other 
2 individuals that were outside in the main part of the room, 
3 took money out of the till. Those individuals then fled from 
4 the store. 
5 THE COURT: I see. 
6 Does Mr. Shaffer disagree with any part of the 
7 proffer by the State's attorney? 
8 MS. CHRISTIANSON: No, Judge. 
9 MR. SHAFFER: No, your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. 
11 Mr. Shaffer, I'll find that it does in fact make out 
12 the factual basis. 
13 Mr. Shaffer, the form in front of you, your attorney 
14 said she read it, you followed along; did you read it and 
15 understand it? 
16 MR. SHAFFER: Yes, your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Did you--are you willing to give up 
18 those rights? 
19 MR. SHAFFER: Yes, your Honor. 
2 0 THE COURT: Are you doing all of this voluntarily? 
21 MR. SHAFFER: Yes, your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: I'll ask you to sign it then, please. 
23 THE BAILIFF: Are you right-handed? 
24 MR. SHAFFER: Yeah, right. 
25 MS. CHRISTIANSON: Permission to approach, your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: I'll--thank you. I'll accept it and 
make it a part of the record. 
Mr. Shaffer, do you have any other questions for 
your attorney? 
MR. SHAFFER: No. Not at the moment. 
THE COURT: All right. To the charge of aggravated 
robbery, a first-degree felony, how is--what is your plea, 
guilty or not guilty? 
MR. SHAFFER: Guilty. 
THE COURT: I'll accept the guilty plea. 
I'll refer Mr. Shaffer to the Department of 
Corrections for a pre-sentence report. 
And set sentencing, unless there's an objection, on 
February the 9th at 9:00 o'clock. 
MS. CHRISTIANSON: That works for me, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Shaffer, we'll see you back 
then. 
MS. CHRISTIANSON: Thank you, Judge. That's all I 
have, if I may be excused. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Transcriber's Note: Speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
MS. CHRISTIANSON: Your Honor, would the Court be 
willing to call Abraham Shaffer. 
THE COURT: I sure will. 
MS. CHRISTIANSON: May I approach, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes, you may. 
MS. JOHNSON: Sandi Johnson for the State. 
THE COURT: Counsel, I received the papers from the 
Judicial Supervision Services this morning that you'd sent 
over. 
MS. CHRISTIANSON: Great. Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. CHRISTIANSON: McCaye Christianson appearing 
with Abraham Shaffer. This matter is set for sentencing, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Uh huh (affirmative). And I have read 
the report, again, and I'm familiar with the information there 
as well as letters that have been submitted and the--the 
review of the information from Judicial Supervision Services. 
So, Counsel, go ahead. 
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MS. CHRISTIANSON: All right, your Honor. Thank 
you. 
Your Honor, what--as the Court is aware, at the time 
of our sentencing in this matter, there was a negotiated 
settlement of the charges and as a part of those negotiations, 
the State agreed to recommend a year in jail beyond the time 
that the defendant had already served and at the conclusion of 
that year, they would recommend he be placed on probation. 
And I'm asking the Court this morning to follow the 
State's recommendation, which I believe the State will be 
renewing later and which time--the State had agreed to at the 
time that the pleas were taken--that the plea was taken. 
There are two specific matters I'd like to address, 
your Honor, if the Court will indulge me--
THE COURT: Sure. 
MS. CHRISTIANSON: --in regards to the pre-sentence 
report that was prepared by A P & P and also some of these 
matters are echoed in the second report that was prepared by 
Judicial Supervision Services. First of all, your Honor, the-
-the pre-sentence reports, both pre-sentence reports indicated 
that they felt that Abraham was minimizing his involvement in 
this--the robbery that occurred. 
And so I'd like to just review the--the facts a 
little bit with your Honor in regards to what happened in this 
underlying count. 
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The allegation is that Abraham and two other young 
men went to the cell phone business, Sprint Communications, 
that they went in. When they arrived, Abraham did not 
brandish a firearm, he went back to a storage room in back of 
the store and loaded up his arms with cell phones and as he 
was leaving the storage room, he was confronted by Cassie 
Mills, a very intrepid and courageous clerk who worked in the 
store, who actually, physically confronted Abraham, dislodging 
some of the cell phones from Abraham's arms. 
When Abraham bent down to pick up those cell phones, 
he, Abraham says, that a gun which he had in his waist band 
fell out of his waist band and he then picked it up and held 
it on Mr. Mills and ordered Mr. Mills onto the floor and 
ordered him to stay, this would be at gun point that he 
ordered Mr. Mills to stay on the floor. And so he and the 
(inaudible) the crime scene. 
Mr. Mills has indicated that--or--or testified at 
the prelim and otherwise indicated that Abraham pulled the 
gun--the phones fell, Abraham pulled the gun out of his waist 
band, dropped the gun, picked up the gun and the phones and 
then held the gun on Mr. Mills. 
So, there is a slight discrepancy in whether the gun 
fell first or was pulled out first, but everybody agrees that 
Abraham did hold the gun on Mr. Mills, that he pointed it at 
Mr. Mills at close range and that he ordered Mr. Mills to get 
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on the floor. 
So, I think everyone agrees, including Abraham, that 
the behavior was extremely menacing and did involve forcing 
Mr. Mills onto the ground with the use of a firearm. 
Additionally, your Honor, both pre-sentence 
investigators got kind of hung up on whether or not Abraham 
had said--had threatened to blow Mr. Mills' head off. Abraham 
said that he didn't make that threat and in reviewing the--the 
police reports and other documentation in regards to this 
case, I just wanted to indicate to the Court, there was an 
initial police report on the day of the robbery in which the 
police report attributed to Mr. Mills' statement that--that 
Abraham had said, Get on the floor and if you don't stay 
there, I'll blow your head off. 
But then Mr. Mills was interviewed later in the day, 
the same day of the robbery, by a police officer who quoted 
Mr. Mills, in quotation marks, as saying that Abraham told 
him, Get on the floor and stay there until we leave the store 
and there was no mention of a threat to blow his head off. 
Mr. Mills, that same day, wrote a statement, which I 
have provided to the Court, a handwritten statement, in which 
he says that Abraham had ordered him to get on the floor and 
stay there and there's no mention of blowing his head off. 
And then again, Mr. Mills actually testified at a 
preliminary hearing in this matter and was posed a question on 
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any statements or threats that may have been made to him at 
the time of the robbery and at the prelim, when specifically 
asked whether he was threatened, he said that he was not; 
although, of course, he said, you know, he was holding a gun 
to my head. I mean, there--there was obviously a--not only an 
implicit but an overt threat of violence, but at the prelim, 
he did not testify in regards to any verbal threat to blow his 
head off being made. 
And your Honor, I--personally, I don't really think 
it's that important, but I just wanted to clarify that with 
the Court that that really is in dispute and it appears that--
that even--it's not necessarily clear that even Mr. Mills 
would assert that those exact words were said. 
I don't know that it matters what exact words were 
said, he had a gun held to his head and obviously, there was a 
threat, an overt threat. I don't know that it matters, but I-
-I'm only going over that with the Court here because I feel 
that the pre-sentence investigators sort of clung to that 
discrepancy to make their case that Abraham wasn't accepting 
responsibility. And I think that he has accepted 
responsibility for robbing someone at gun point, regardless of 
what exactly--what words were--were said at the time. 
Also, your Honor, in the--the pre-sentence report 
that was done by A P & P, the investigator suggests that 
Abraham isn't taking responsibility because he doesn't admit 
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being a member in a gang. And the--the A P & P investigator 
seems to feel that because there was originally a gang 
enhancement charged in this case and because Abraham referred 
to the co-perpetrators by nicknames that that proves that 
Abraham--Abraham is a gang member. And obviously, the gang 
enhancement is more of a group enhancement, not necessarily 
indicating gang membership and I think the fact that Abraham 
may have known nicknames which--which the co-perpetrators used 
doesn't mean that he was a member of their gang or--or I don't 
know if they were in the same gang, if they are gang members, 
but I don't think that there's proof of gang membership here. 
And the fact that Abraham denies gang membership, I think, 
should not be seen as denial of responsibility or refusal to 
admit what he did here. 
All right. Next, your Honor, the--the pre-sentence 
investigators remarked on the write-ups that Abraham had 
during the, I think it's been about, I don't know, 14 months 
now that he's been in the County Jail, and it's true that 
Abraham has had numerous write-ups, but he--he has brought 
those with him this morning and I don't know if the Court 
would like to look those over. I have those if the Court 
would like to see those; but your Honor, they're write-ups for 
passing a note, passing an envelope, passing a candy bar. His 
toilet got clogged and he was sweeping the water out of his 
cell into the corridor. I--I don't see any indication that--
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that the toilet was deliberately clogged, but it's a matter 
of--of how he was dealing with the water by sweeping it into 
the corridor that was a problem. 
He had a pen, on one occasion. He believed that a 
guard had removed some food from his tray to antagonize him 
and--and he threw the tray, not at the guard, but out--out of 
the--I'm sorry, it was not a guard, but an inmate, who 
apparently had removed some food, (inaudible) and Abraham 
threw the tray, not at the other inmate, however. 
So, I just want to say that I think looking over the 
write-ups, I think that they show some immaturity on Abraham's 
part, some difficulty adjusting to the extremely stressful and 
highly constrained circumstances of the jail, but there isn't 
anything like an attack on a guard, an attack on another 
prisoner, there's no allegation of a criminal misconduct in 
the jail. 
And I have talked to Abraham about the--the 
seriousness, even, of--of minor matters and the importance of 
complying with all the rules while he is in the County Jail. 
And I believe that he is resolved to--to not give into 
childish impulses to act out, not to do things like--like 
giving someone an envelope or giving someone a candy bar that 
might seem insignificant, but that nevertheless is a breach in 
a security institution and is a violation of the rules. 
And I believe that if the Court would--would follow 
9 
the State's recommendation in this matter and give Abraham the 
opportunity to serve an additional year in the jail, that 
these types of infractions will not continue to occur. 
And next, your Honor, I--I just wanted to point out 
to the Court that I did provide the Court with a couple of 
photographs that Abraham's mother wanted the Court to have 
and--and I know that the Court, there are many, many, many 
matters pending before the Court and I don't know if the Court 
has any independent recollection of Abraham's appearances, but 
his family has been present at his appearances, his mother and 
sisters are here today, as well as his spiritual advisor, Rod 
Gilmore. 
Abraham has a very, very supportive and loving 
family and his mother wanted the Court to have those 
photographs just to let the Court know that--that Abraham is 
a--a young person who, until late in his teenage years, was 
(inaudible) youth; in recent years, he has been arrested a 
number of times, according to their--I think there are a few 
or a couple of misdemeanor convictions on his record, but no 
felony convictions. And his--his family just wanted the Court 
to know that he is--that he has been a--a good and high-
functioning, loyal, treasured member of their family and they-
- their belief is that he has the determination to become that 
again. 
The Court has letters from past employers who are--
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have really valued Abraham's services as an employee and 
would--would welcome the opportunity of again engaging his 
services when he's released from the County Jail. 
Your Honor, also, I just want to draw the Court's 
attention to the--the issue of inter-case proportionality. 
The co-perpetrators in this matter, my understanding is that 
they served a year in jail and were then placed on probation 
after pleading guilty to second-degree felonies. And I feel, 
since Abraham was the only person who is known to have been 
carrying a gun on that day, it makes sense that he enter a 
plea to a first as opposed to a second and that he would serve 
two or two-plus years in jail rather than one year in jail; 
but I think looking at the way that the co-perpetrators were 
handled, the resolution that was endorsed by Ms. Johnson on 
behalf of the District Attorney's Office makes sense. 
And finally, your Honor, I just wanted to let the 
Court know that during the pendency of these proceedings 
before your Honor, I've had opportunity to visit on numerous 
occasions with Abraham and he has expressed his remorse to me, 
he's expressed profound shame and regret about his behavior. 
He's expressed, on his own, without being prompted, he's 
expressed sympathy for the--the victim and speculated that it 
would be a very terrifying experience to be robbed at 
gunpoint. He's expressed regret that he ever was engaged in 
behavior that would have caused so much fear to another 
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person. 
And your Honor, I--my impression, based on my 
dealing with him is that his expressions of remorse are 
sincere and that he genuinely desires to address problems in 
his life that have led to this low point and to--to change his 
life and become--to get back on the track that he was on as a 
younger man and not have any future involvement with the 
criminal justice system. 
I believe if the Court follows the State's 
recommendations, that Abraham will not disappoint you. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Shaffer, anything else you'd 
like to say? 
MR. SHAFFER: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. SHAFFER: Well, I would like to apologize for--
as to the behavior I did. I really am deeply sorry for just 
being so stupid and allowing myself to do something so--this 
is a terrible thing that I did, a aggravated robbery and 
robbing someone at gunpoint. I--I didn't realize at the time 
how long it would be, but--and how terrifying it would be to 
be a store clerk at that time. If he were here, I would like 
to apologize to him. 
And I want to apologize to my family for acting the 
way I did and letting them down with my (inaudible) a criminal 
act and I want--I want to try my hardest if I get another 
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chance to get back on the right track and get on with my life 
and just be--be a credit to the society (inaudible) 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, Ms. Johnson, did you have 
comments or recommendations? 
MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I would just note that the 
State is recommending that the defendant be given 3 65 days 
jail with no credit for the time he's already served, that 
after that, he be placed on 36-month probation with Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
I am asking for gang conditions, while the defendant 
may claim he's not a member of a gang, given that the co-
defendants he was with were members of gangs, they're 
documented members of gangs and the defense has verified that 
he needs to have gang conditions. 
I was unaware of the defendant's write-ups at the 
jail until I received the pre-sentence report, which was prior 
to my recommendation. I've reviewed those, I'm still going to 
stick with my recommendation. It is a zero tolerance. 
In this case, although the defendant's is now being 
very supported, I have concerns with the defendant's family; 
frankly, his father, your--your Honor actually heard the 
material witness hearing where the father went and manipulated 
a--a gentleman into writing a false statement about Mr. 
Shaffer's whereabouts. And so I think his family support 
doesn't necessarily give me any reassurances that he's going 
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to behave. 
And his sister went in and lied to his attorney and 
then forwarded that--that on to myself in order to get him 
off. His father went and procured a false statement; so, 
frankly, anything from his family, I don't take to be true. 
While he may have been a good boy at one point, he 
did take a turn for the worst and this behavior, itself, I 
think warrants, at minimum, another year in jail followed by 
36-months probation. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
And the complaining witness is not here, Counsel, to 
speak? 
MS. JOHNSON: No, your Honor, Mr. Mills is not here. 
He did express to me on numerous occasions, including at the 
preliminary hearing, that--well, first of all, with regard to 
restitution, that restitution amount does need to be ordered. 
The phones were returned to Sprint, but they were not able to 
be sold at all and the restitution amount of $2,13 6, I did 
verify with Mr. Mills and Sprint--or Sprint Communications, 
actually, I guess, that that is the amount of restitution for 
those phones. They had all been removed from the boxes and 
been compromised, their--the chips and so they were unable to 
be sold. 
And with regards to Mr. Mills, he felt that the 
defendant should be incarcerated for as long as possible. 
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I did talk with him about the resolution and he was 
fine with the resolution. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Shaffer, it's a difficult 
decision for me, because of your age, really. If you weren't 
as young as you are, there would be no question in my mind 
that I would sentence you to prison. 
In looking at what you've been charged with doing, 
the crime certainly warrants the sentence of imprisonment. 
Whether or not the gun fell first or whether you pulled it 
from your waist band really isn't critical and I suppose 
whether you uttered the words "Get down on the ground or I'm 
going to shoot you or blow your head off," the threat was 
certainly there. It's hard to interpret in any other way when 
you pulled a gun on him. 
And then the fact that not only did--did your 
friends and yourself steal the phones that I guess they'd gone 
on--into the store to steal in the first place, but looted the 
till and took additional merchandise from the front of the 
store, it's such a serious crime, Mr. Shaffer, I'm comfortable 
with the recommendations that they make here, as difficult as 
it is. I'm going to follow them and impose the indeterminate 
term of five years to life in the State penitentiary. 
I'll also order that you pay the restitution in the 
sum of $2,136, that would be jointly and severally with the 
co-defendants; but--but given what you've done here, it just 
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seems to me that a sentence of imprisonment is the only 
reasonable sentence. So, I'll follow the recommendation. 
MS. CHRISTIANSON: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
• * * 
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